SSRF

Part 2 of the Boro Senpai series: SSRF via Docker internal hostname.

Abusing ImageMagick’s SVG text: pseudo-coder to read the flag file via server-side image conversion.

SSRF via Docker internal hostname to reach the metadata service and retrieve the flag.

An exposed Spring Boot Actuator plus an nginx /.;/ path-ACL bypass leaks admin creds and the first flag; an HTTP/2 H2.CL desync then captures an internal bot’s request, stealing its flag cookie.

SSRF via a pycurl download endpoint chains into file:// LFI, Werkzeug debug PIN cracking, and full RCE on a Dockerised Flask app.

XSS in a registration form exfiltrates the admin’s session cookie; RFI via the admin URL-tester gives www-data code execution; double-MD5 cracking yields SSH access, and a sudo apache2 logging trick writes a root SSH key.

A read-only anonymous FTP gateway turns out to be a Redis health-check proxy; abusing the PORT command for an FTP bounce plus a newline-smuggled RETR inline command yields a bidirectional Redis relay that scans the subnet and reads the flag.

A Money Heist–themed Flask app hides a flag split into three fragments behind a server-side URL fetcher, bypassed with a DNS-based SSRF to reach the internal API and a privileged file-read endpoint.

A Pyodide client serializes requests with pickle obfuscated by a hardcoded XOR key, letting the server pickle.loads attacker data for unauthenticated root RCE, then hooking the live handler to capture the adminbot’s plaintext login password.

The hardened secretpickle runs pickle.loads in a write-only seccomp sandbox, but the adminbot action visits an attacker URL with no scheme check and returns a screenshot, so file:///flag.txt renders the flag into the image.